Vol. 66 (2026)
Research articles

Scope of application of the right against self-incrimination: An analysis of international and comparative case law, and a criticism of the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence

Javier Escobar Veas
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Crime, Security and Law, Alemania

Published 2026-08-31

Keywords

  • Right against self-incrimination,
  • right to remain silent,
  • incriminating evidence

How to Cite

Escobar Veas, J. (2026). Scope of application of the right against self-incrimination: An analysis of international and comparative case law, and a criticism of the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence. Pro Jure Revista De Derecho - Pontificia Universidad Católica De Valparaíso, 66. https://doi.org/10.4151/S02810-76592026066-1563

Abstract

The right against self-incrimination is generally understood as the right of every person to remain silent and not be compelled to cooperate in an investigation against themselves. One of the most relevant debates surrounding this right concerns its application beyond criminal proceedings. Should it also apply to proceedings of a different nature, such as those involving competition law? In August 2025, the Constitutional Court ruled against this in judgment 15768-2024. This article challenges the decision, arguing that the right not to incriminate oneself should also be applicable in non-criminal proceedings. To support this assertion, we review international and comparative case law. Our analysis shows that most courts recognize the validity of this guarantee in proceedings outside the criminal justice system. A comparison of international and comparative jurisprudence with that of the Constitutional Court reveals that the latter has adopted an isolated position that contradicts the standards set by international human rights bodies.