Expert evidence and the autonomy of the judge: Between epistemic dependence and the obligation to decide

Abstract

This paper explores the tension between judicial autonomy and epistemic dependence on expert knowledge in the use of expert evidence. Traditionally, the debate has been structured as a dilemma between scientifically educating the judge to understand expert content or adopting an attitude of uncritical deference toward their assertions. This dilemma, however, could be resolved by paying greater attention to a version of the epistemic deference model that, based on reasons-based, epistemically responsible trust, allows the judge to expand knowledge without falling into blind credulity or losing cognitive agency. To this end, two often confused conceptual levels are distinguished: epistemic autonomy, referring to the judge’s cognitive self-sufficiency, and deliberative autonomy, linked to their institutional duty to decide for themselves. From the acceptance of a social epistemic commitment, it is argued that: i) the tension in «epistemic autonomy» becomes an apparent problem; ii) what theorists are concerned with is ensuring the judges’ «deliberative autonomy»; and iii) the model that best promotes both conditions —partially delegating epistemic autonomy while preserving deliberative autonomy— is that of epistemic deference.